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COMMENTS
ARBITRATION OF TITLE VII AND PARALLEL STATE
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS: A PROPOSAL
Valerie accepts a job at Designworks Furniture as a showroom manager. On
the first day of her job, she signs an employment agreement containing an
arbitration1 clause. The arbitration clause requires Valerie to arbitrate any
claim which arises out of her employment with Designworks. Two months later,
Valerie becomes engaged to Donald, another Designworks employee. Once
Valerie and Donald announce their engagement, a Designworks supervisor
immediately demotes Valerie to a stock manager position saying, "We can't have
you parading around the showroom looking for lovers."
Valerie decides to pursue a sex discrimination claim against Designworks.
Instead of arbitrating her claim under the arbitration clause in her employment
contract, Valerie files her claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission2 ("EEOC") alleging a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 ("Title VIP).? Once the EEOC notifies Designworks of the claim,
1. "Arbitration is the submission of a dispute to one or more impartial persons for a final and
binding decision." AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT DiSprrEs: MODEL
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION PROCEDURES 3 (1989).
Commercial arbitration is dispute resolution between private individuals and private businesses
pursuant to a private arbitration agreement, whereas labor arbitration is dispute resolution between
unions and employers pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. See M. DOME, COMMERCIAL
ARBnRATON § 1.01 (G. Wilner rev. ed. 1988 & Supp. 1989) (for a discussion of the general scope
of commercial arbitration).
Commercial arbitration pursuant to a private arbitration agreement affecting interstate commerce
is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988). See infra note 7. Labor
arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement is governed by the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982) ("LMRA!). Although the United States Supreme
Court has never ruled on the applicability of the FAA to labor arbitration, it has "expressed its
preference for analyzing collective bargaining arbitration under § 301 of the LMRA rather than under
the FAA." Shell, ERSA and Other Federal Employment Statutes: When is CommercialArbitration an
'Adequate Substitute" for the Courts?, 68 TEx. L REV. 509,527 n.114 (1990) (citing cases). See United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) C'IVarrior & Gulf).
This Comment focuses on arbitration of Title VII and parallel state claims in the commercial
arbitration context. However, references are made to arbitration in the labor arbitration context when
necessary to aid the discussion.
2. The EEOC is the federal agency created by Title VII to process discrimination charges.
The procedure for processing EEOC charges is discussed in the text accompanying notes 121-135,
infra.
3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. V
1987) (forbids employers and unions from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin). This Comment will focus on arbitration of Title VII and parallel state discrimination
claims. However, the discussion and analysis of arbitrating discrimination claims and the suggested
proposals can be applied to other statutory discrimination rights as well. See generally Ueberman,
Comment: Overcoming the Presumption of Arbitrabilit, of ADEA Claims: The Triumph of Substantive
over Procedural Values in Nicholson v. CPC International Inc, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1817 (1990)
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Valerie's work situation becomes unbearable. Both Valerie and Donald
terminate their employment with Designworks and immediately find other
employment with Shaw's Furniture.
Six months Tpass and the EEOC finally issues Valerie a right-to-sue notice in
federal court. Valerie files her complaint against Designworks and waits two
years to litigate her claim. At trial, the court finds that Designworks' comments
and behavior violate Title VII and awards Valerie attorney's fees and backpay for
the two week interval when Valerie was between jobs.5 If Valerie had arbitrated
her claim, she probably would have received a higher award and the dispute
would have been resolved more quickly and cheaply. This Comment addresses
Valerie's situation and illustrates why arbitration should play a more direct role
in resolving Title VII and parallel state discrimination claims.
L STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Historically, Title VII claims and parallel state employment discrimination
claims have not been subject to resolution through binding arbitration.
Although recent United States Supreme Court cases affirm and endorse
arbitration of federal and state statutory rights in general,6 lower federal and
state courts continue to affirm policies which override the mandate to arbitrate
under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA").7 Specifically, both federal and state
courts have held that the federal policy favoring judicial resolution of employ-
ment discrimination claims outweighs the policy favoring arbitration.8
This affirmation is justified when arbitration procedures are deficient because
arbitration may then fail to redress rights founded upon Title VII and parallel
(arguing that public policy supports exempting discrimination claims, ADEA claims in particular, from
binding arbitration).
4. See infra note 134.
5. See infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 34-59.
7. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14. The FAA makes all arbitration agreements involving interstate
commerce and maritime transactions enforceable. Section 2 of the FAA provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
To meet this goal, the FAA provides two enforcement mechanisms. The court can stay court
proceedings involving any matter referable to arbitrate under the FAA. 9 U.S.C. § 3. The court can
also compel parties to arbitrate upon a showing that the dispute is arbitrable under the FAA. 9
U.S.C. § 4.
For cases which hold that certain statutory rights cannot be subject to binding arbitration, see note
24, infra.
8. Alexanderv. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883
F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 842 (1990); Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l,
Inc., 858 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1988); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 547 (S.D. Tex.
1989); Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 449 N.W.2d 468 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); DeSapio v.
Josephthal & Co., 143 Misc. 2d 611, 540 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1989).
[Vol. 27
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state statutes. However, when arbitration procedures provide adequate
protection of statutory rights, lower courts must not ignore the United States
Supreme Court's approval of arbitration as an acceptable forum for resolving
statutory claims.9
This Comment suggests that the Supreme Court's recent endorsement of
arbitrating complex statutory claims should lead to an approval of arbitrating
Title VII as well as parallel state antidiscrimination claims.10 Section II discus-
ses the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration, and the growing acceptance
of arbitrating statutory claims. Section III reviews the language in several recent
United States Supreme Court cases which explicitly rejects the presumption that
arbitration is an inferior forum for resolving statutory rights. Section IV
discusses and criticizes a recent Eighth Circuit case where the court held that a
judicial forum must be preserved for Title VII and parallel state discrimination
claims notwithstanding the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. Section
V proposes an amendment to Title VII which would accommodate both the
policy against employment discrimination and the policy favoring arbitration.
Section V also suggests ways employers could make arbitration a more adequate
and attractive forum for resolving federal and state discrimination claims, and
appeals to organizations to encourage and facilitate arbitrating these claims.
This Comment concludes that arbitration can, under certain conditions,
provide an adequate forum for vindicating federal and state discrimination rights.
However, until employers make arbitration an even more attractive forum for
resolving discrimination claims, and Congress enacts laws consistent with the
FAA to enforce arbitration agreements when conditions warrant, employees will
lose the benefits of the arbitration for which they bargained.
II. ARBITRATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO
LITIGATING DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES
The suitability of arbitration as a forum for resolving statutory claims has
received much attention recently. The legal community has recognized that
arbitrators can complement the courts' traditional role in interpreting and
applying state and federal statutes.
Arbitration has developed over time as a viable alternative to litigation.'
The enactment of the FAA in 1925 was a milestone in reversing the traditional
9. See infra text accompanying notes 34-59. But see Lieberman, supra note 3, at 1853
(advocating that discrimination claims should be an exception to the "Court's celebration of arbitral
competence").
10. This Comment focuses on arbitration of employment discrimination claims pursuant to
private agreements negotiated before the alleged discrimination takes place. This Comment does not
discuss voluntary submission of discrimination claims to arbitration after the alleged discrimination
takes place.
11. See geiwrally Faure, TheArbitradonAlternadve: Its Tune Has Come, 46 MoNr. L Rav. 199
(1985).
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hostility toward arbitration 12 and signaled the birth of a national policy favoring
arbitration. 3 The FAA makes all arbitration agreements affecting interstate
commerce and maritime transactions "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable," 4 and
places arbitration agreements "upon the same footing as other contracts.... "15
A Advantages and Disadvantages of Arbitration
Arbitration offers several advantages which make it an attractive forum for
both employers and employees to resolve discrimination claims.t6 First,
arbitration is simple and efficient. Second, arbitration is relatively inexpensive
compared to the costs of a full-blown court trial. Third, the process is speedy
and final, avoiding the delay caused by trial procedures and crowded court
dockets.t Fourth, the arbitrator selected to resolve the dispute may be a
technical specialist in the field of the dispute.r8 Finally, arbitration proceedings
are informal, private, and confidential, which increases the possibility of more
amicable dispute resolution. 9
12. The courts routinely refused to enforce agreements to arbitrate because arbitration was
considered an attack on the court's jurisdiction. "Some centuries ago, because of the jealousy of the
English courts for their own jurisdiction, they refused to enforce specific agreements to arbitrate upon
the ground that the courts were thereby ousted from their jurisdiction. This jealousy survived.., and
was adopted ... by the American courts." H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1924), quoted
in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,220 n.6 (1985). See Comment, Arbitrability of
Disputes Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 71 IowA L REv. 1137, 1139-1141 (1986); Faure, supra
note 11, at 201. See generally T. OF.EMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBnrATION § 2:3 (1987 & Supp. 1990) (for
a general history of arbitration); Cohen & Dayton, The New FederalArbitration Law, 12 VA. L REV.
265 (1926).
13. See, ag, Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983) (The FAA "is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agree-
ment.... .'); Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. v. The S.5. Mihalis Angelos, 234 F. Supp. 236, 238
(S.D.N.Y. 1964) (The "federal policy regarding the enforceability of contracts to arbitrate is sopervasive that arbitration should be decreed in any case where federal standards are met.").
14. See supra note 7.
15. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Seas. 1 (1924), quoted in Dean Wilier Reynolds, Inc.
v. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 213, 219 (1985). Most states followed Congress' lead and enacted their own
arbitration laws which apply to contracts involving intrastate commerce.
16. See generally Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.BA. J. 274 (Mar. 1982); Edwards,
Advantages of Arbitration Over Litigation: Reflections of a Judge, 1982 PRoc. 35Tm ANN. MEING
NA'r'L ACAD. Altn. 16 [hereinafter Edwards, Reflections]; Fletcher, Arbitration of Title II Claims:
Some Judicial Perceptions, 1981 PRoc. 34TH ANN. MEErlNG NAT'L ACAD. AnB. 218; R. CCULSON,
BUSINE.SS AnRrRATIoN-WHAT YOU NEnD rO KNOW (2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter R. COULSON, BuJSiN~rss
ARnrrRATuON]; Newman, Post-Gardner-Denver Developments in the Arbitration of Discrimination
Claims, 1975 PROC. 0OF ThEI 28Th ANN. MEETING NAT'L ACAD. OF Ann. 36.
17. See infra note 25 and accompanying text
18. The parties to an arbitration usually choose the arbitrator so they benefit from the
"acceptability factor," whereas in court, cases may be won or lost by the luck of the draw in judge
assignments. Edwards, Reflections, supra note 16, at 25. 'he ablest judge cannot be expected to bring
the same experience and competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance, because he
cannot be similarly informed." Newman, supra note 16, at 42 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am.
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)).
19. "[ he employee.., has a strong incentive to arbitrate grievances, and arbitration may
often eliminate those misunderstandings or discriminatory practices that might otherwise precipitate
resort to the judicial forum." Aletander, 415 U.S. at 55. See Carmell & Westercamp, TheArbtration
of EEO Claims: A Decade After Gardner-Denver, 60 N.Y. Sr. B . 26,28 (ian. 1988).
[Vol. 27
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However, where public policy issues like employment discrimination are
concerned, these advantages may become obstacles. First, arbitrators are not
required to apply substantive or procedural law." Second, arbitrators are not
required to apply the rules of evidence.2' Third, arbitrators do not have to give
reasons for their decisions.n Finally, arbitration awards are subject to judicial
review only upon narrow grounds.? Considering these factors, courts have held
that arbitration is not binding for certain statutory rights.24
Despite these limitations, arbitration is still considered an attractive forum for
resolving discrimination claims, especially since the EEOC and courts have been
hampered by huge, unmanageable caseloads.25 The long delay in reaching a
20. Shell, The Role of Public Law In Private Dispute Resolution: Reflections on
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 397,421 (1988) ('[L]aw does not enjoy
the official status in arbitration that it does in court.') (footnote omitted). Of course, the arbitration
agreement can always provide otherwise.
21. "The arbitrator shall be the judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence offered,
and conformity to legal rules of evidence shall not be necessary." AMBReCAN ARBriRATION ASSOCIA-
TION, COMMERCIAL ARBI TAnoN Rutm, Rule 31 (effective Jan. 1, 1990) [hereinafter AAA Rule].
22. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960)
C"Enterprise Wheel"); Shell, supra note 20, at 421. Cf R. CULSON, BusiNESS ARBITRATION, supra note
16, at 27 ("If arbitrators are required to produce comprehensive findings of fact and conclusions of
law, the role of the commercial arbitrator would be changed considerably.').
23. The FAA permits judicial review in four circumstances:
(1) When the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(2) Where there was apparent partiality or corruption on the part of the arbitrators.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in conducting the hearing such that the rights
of either party are prejudiced.
(4) Where arbitrators exceeded their powers or failed to exercise their powers so that a final,
mutual, and definite award was not made. 9 U.S.C. § 10.
24. See e g., Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557 (1987) (Federal Employers'
Liability Act claims); McDonald v. West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (Civil Rights claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (FLSA claims);
Alesander, 415 U.S. 36 (Title VII claims); U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351 (1971)
(Seaman's Wages Act claims); McKinney v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co., 357 U.S. 265 (1958)
(Universal Military Training and Service Act claims); Bird v. Shearson Lehman/American Express,
Inc., 871 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1989), vacated and remanded, Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc.
v. Bird., 110 S. Ct. 225 (1989) (ERISA claims, vacated and remanded for consideration in light of
Rodriguez de Quijas v. ShearsonlAmerican Epress, Inc., 109 S.Ct. 1917 (1989)). Nichoison v. CPC
Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989) (federal ADEA claims); Swenson, 858 F.2d 1304 (Title VII and
parallel state discrimination claims); American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d
821 (2d Cir. 1968) (federal anti-trust claims). See also cases cited supra note 8.
25. Over 233,000 cases were filed in U.S. district courts in 1989. Cup, Fiing the Federal
Courts, 76 A.B.A. J. 63, 63 (June 1990). If the present growth rate continues, 600,000-700,000 cases
will be filed by the year 2015. Id, Supreme Court Justice Byron White, in addressing the American
Bar Association, estimated that "the median time for cases in federal courts is 14 months." Anderson,
Pacific Rim ADR, 75 A.B.A. J. 38, 38 (Oct. 1989). See Edwards, Reflections, supra note 16, at 20-21
("If anything, these past two decades have revealed certain fallibilities of our court system, not of
arbitration, as an excessive caseload has more and more burdened the judiciary.'); Fletcher, supra note
16, at 228 (hIe courts and the EEOC are poor instruments for the vindication of individual
grievants' claims. There is no commitment or capacity to preserve ongoing relationships. Detailed
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resolution through the EEOC,2s and finally through the courts z discourages
victims of discrimination from utilizing the Title VII scheme.s
The competence of arbitrators is another important factor to consider when
evaluating the feasibility of arbitrating discrimination claims. 9 The arbitrator's
role has expanded beyond mere contract interpretationYo This new role reflects
the growing consensus that arbitrators are competent to decide statutory issues
if they are adequately trained and familiar with the surrounding law.3
Arbitrators are finding themselves in positions where they must refer to statutes
to decide discrimination issues.32 Some arbitrators have even indicated in their
26. See infra text accompanying notes 121-35.
The EEOC received 66,305 charges of employment discrimination against private-sector employees
in 1986-1987. During the same period, state and local fair employment agencies received 52,139
charges. A. WESIN & A. FEUU, RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES WriioUr LITIGATION 1 (1988).
See Newman, supra note 16, at 37 (ehe relative speed of the arbitral solution affords tremendous
advantages as compared with the delays imposed by the tremendous backlog of cases before the
EEOC, other federal and state civil rights agencies, and the courts, especially in view of the inevitable
additional problems generated by uncertainty during periods of delay").
27. During 1986-1987, private individuals, or government antidiscrimination agencies suing on
behalf of private individuals, filed over 10,000 employment discrimination cases in federal or state
courts. A. \VEs'N & A. FEuu, supra note 26, at 1.
28. See R. COULSON, BUSINESS ARBrTRATION, supra note 16, at 28 ("Americans are losing
patience with judicial solutions that take years in coming and leave both parties exhausted by delays
and legal expenses.").
29. See Carmell & Westercamp, supra note 19, at 30 n.32 (citing statistics from a survey where
659 labor attorneys indicated that the most important qualifications for an arbitrator of Title VII
claims is prior experience with discrimination claims and Title VII law).
30. But see Alexander, 415 U.S. at 53-54 ('[Tlhe arbitrator has authority to resolve only
questions of contractual rights .... "); United States Commission on Civil Rights, Employment
Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1224 (1971)
[hereinafter Commission on Civil Rights] (the arbitrator's sole function is interpretation of contract
provisions, not statutory law).
31. One commentator noted:
I believe that arbitration should be explored as a mechanism for the resolution of
individual claims of discrimination in unorganized, as well as unionized, sectors of the
employment market.
As for concerns about the competence of arbitrators to hear such claims, I have no
doubt that there are many highly qualified arbitrators who could easily be trained to
deal with this limited category of public law issues.
Edwards, Reflections, supra note 16, at 28 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). It is interesting
to note that this same author previously opposed arbitrators deciding public law issues. See Edwards,
Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases: An Empirical Study, 1976 PRoc. OF THE 28TH ANN.
MEETING NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 59; Edwards, Labor Arbitration at the Crossroads: "The Common Law
of the Shop" Versus External Law, 32 ARB. J. 65 (June 1977). See also Fletcher, supra note 16, at 228
("I think arbitrators have it within their power and their grasp to improve the [grievance-arbitration]
process in order to accomplish the goals of Title VII, in the context of the traditional forum.").
32. See Edwards, Reflections, supra note 16, at 21-22 ('Arbitrators frequently must consider
public laws in order to resolve private disputes.'); St. Antoine, Judicial Review of LaborArbfration
Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and its Progeny, 1975 PRoc. 30TH ANN. MEETING NAT'L
ACAD. ARB. 29, 35-36 ("[R]ecent statutes [such] as Title VII... are so interwoven in the fabric of
collective bargaining agreements that it is simply impracticable in many cases for arbitrators to deal
with contractual provisions without taking into account statutory provisions.... "); Newman, supra
note 16, at 48 (footnote omitted) ("In the past decade.., arbitrators have frequently cited Title VII
and held that they must apply it, although the collective bargaining contract had no language referring
to Title VII or any other law.'); Commission on Civil Rights, supra note 30, at 1224 (most arbitrators
[Vol. 27
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awards that they researched cases under the federal law to guide their deci-
sions.33
IIL THE SUPREME COURT ENDORSES ARBITRATION
In recent cases,3 the Supreme Court has supported arbitration of federal
statutory claims pursuant to the FAA in two ways. First, the Supreme Court has
created a rebuttable presumption in favor of arbitrating federal statutory
claims.35 Second, the Supreme Court has endorsed arbitration as a proper
forum for resolving complex federal statutory claims 6
Recognizing that the FAA mandates rigorous enforcement of arbitration
agreements, 37 the Court has created a presumption that, "as a matter of federal
law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration. ... 38 To implement this presumption, the Court suggests
that "questions of arbitrability must be resolved with a healthy regard for the
federal policy favoring arbitration."39 The Court reasons that "the streamlined
procedures of arbitration do not entail any consequential restriction on
substantive rights"40 because an arbitration agreement merely dictates the type
harmonize contract provisions with the surrounding law).
33. Newman, supra note 16, at 50-51.
34. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989) (holding
that claims under the Securities Act of 1933 are arbitrable, and overruling Wzlko v. Swan, 346 U.S.
427 (1953)); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (holding that claims
under § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act and claims under RICO are arbitrable); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (holding that federal antitrust
violations arising in the international context are arbitrable); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470
U.S. 213 (1985) (rejecting the intertwining doctrine where the federal courts would permit all
arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims to be tried together if the claims arise out of the same transaction
and if the claims were legally and factually related); Moses, 460 U.S. at 29 (upholding the court of
appeals' sua sponte determination of arbitrability under § 4 of the FAA because the parties were not
prejudiced thereby, and the determination facilitated "the prompt arbitration that Congress
envisaged.').
Federal circuit courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead in rejecting the presumption that
arbitration is an inferior forum. See, eg, Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 229 (footnote and citation omitted)('We do not base our conclusion on any disparagement of the competence or sophistication of
modern arbitrators ... and thus we do not deem it dispositive that those portions of those opinions
that reflect the now rejected mistrust of arbitration may not survive the Court's more recent
enthusiastic pronouncement on the virtues of commercial arbitration in Mitsubishi and Shearson
[McMahon].").
35. See infra text accompanying notes 37-42.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 43-52.
37. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221. See supra note 34. Specifically, see McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226 (The
FAA "standing alone ... mandates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims.").
38. Moses, 460 U.S. at 24.
39. Id
40. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 232.
1990]
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of forum without altering the substantive rights afforded by the statute.4 ' This
presumption is in line with the "emphatic policy in favor of arbitral dispute
resolution"42 underlying the FAA.
In addition, the Supreme Court has affirmed its confidence in arbitration as
an appropriate forum for resolving federal statutory issues. Most recently, the
Court noted the erosion of "the old judicial hostility to arbitration "13 which
dominated older decisions,44 and rejected the argument that arbitration is
inferior as an "outmoded presumption."5 The Court has found "the mistrust
of arbitration that formed the basis for the Wilko opinion in 195346 is difficult
to square with the assessment of arbitration that has prevailed since that
time."47 Determined to reverse the negative preconceptions about arbitration,
the Court has stressed that the judicial suspicion of arbitration and the
competence of arbitrators should no longer inhibit the development of
arbitration.4s
Also, the Court now accepts the reality that in most cases arbitrators follow
the law, especially when arbitrating complex statutory issues.49 Thus, the Court
will not presume that arbitrators will ignore applicable statutes.50 Even when
arbitrators do not follow the law, the Court is satisfied that the FAA's provision
granting judicial review of arbitration awards will protect the grievant's statutory
rights.51  Furthermore, the Court notes that the "adaptability and access to
expertise" available in arbitration facilitate the resolution of complex statutory
41. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628 t'y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral,
rather than a judicial, forum. It trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom
for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration:). See also Rodriguez de Quijas, 109 S.
Ct. at 1920; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 229-30.
42. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 631. See generally Burger, supra note 16.
43. Rodriguez de Quijas, 109 S. Ct. at 1920 (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg
Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942)). See supra note 12.
44. Id The Rodriguez de Quijas Court was specifically referring to its decision in Wi/ko v. Swan,
346 U.S. 427 (1953). In Wilko, the plaintiff sued a securities brokerage firm for damages under
section 12(b) of the Securities Act of 1933. Although the plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement
enforceable under the FAA, the United States Supreme Court held that the arbitration agreement
could not be enforced because it violated the policies behind the Securities Act. Also, the Wiko
Court noted that arbitration was inferior because: (1) arbitration is not appropriate for subjective
inquiries; (2) arbitrators are not instructed on the lavr, (3) the arbitrator is not required to give
reasons for his awards; (4) the record in arbitration is incomplete; and (5) power to vacate the award
is limited and there is no judicial review for error in interpretation. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 231
(quoting Vilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435-37 (1953)). Wilko was overruled by the Supreme Court
in Rodiguez de Quijas, 109 S. Ct. 1917.
45. Rodriguez de Quijas, 109 S. Ct. at 1920 CTo the extent that Wilko rested on suspicion of
arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be
complainants, it has fallen far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes
favoring this method of resolving disputes.').
46. See supra note 44.
47. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233.
48. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626-27.
49. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 232.
50. Id C'[There is no reason to assume at the outset that arbitrators will not follow the law.').
51. Id. See supra note 23.
[Vol 27
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issues.
5 2
As the foregoing illustrates, the policy against arbitrating statutory issues is no
longer a firm principle.53 The Supreme Court's recent pronouncements suggest
that arbitration plays a useful role in resolving federal statutory issues. Many
federal statutes which were considered policy exceptions to the FAA's applica-
tion have been either judicially4 or legislatively overruled.55  However, the
Court has recognized that where the congressional intent to preserve a judicial
forum is clear,56 "the Arbitration Act's mandate may be overridden by a
contrary congressional command."57 The Supreme Court has outlined a two-
step test which defeats the application of the FAA to statutory rights: (1)
Congress must have intended to make an exception for the statutory claim, and
(2) the intention must be "discernable from the text, history, or purposes of the
statute."58
IV. SwENsoN: A BREAK IN THE TREND
In a seminal case, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was confronted with the
issue of whether a state statutory sex discrimination claim was subject to
arbitration under the FAA. In Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l Inc.,59
the Eighth Circuit boldly disregarded the Supreme Court's recent decisions
encouraging arbitration of statutory rights6" and concluded that Title VII and
52. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 633. Furthermore, "potential complexity should not suffice to ward
off arbitration." Id. The Mitsubishi Court also noted that the streamlined procedures and lower cost
offered in arbitration actually create an incentive to vindicate statutory rights in arbitration. Id.
53. See Hoellering, Mitsubishi: Arbitrability and Antitrust Clains, 1985 ARBrrRATION & THE
LAw 84, 89-90 (AAA General Counsel's Annual Report).
54. See Rodriguez de Quijas, 109 S. Ct. 1917 (claims under the Securities Act of 1933 are
arbitrable, overruling Wi&o); McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (claims under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and RICO are arbitrable); Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614 (claims under the Sherman
Antitrust Act are arbitrable in international disputes).
55. Congress recently enacted amendments to the patent laws which expressly permit
arbitration of patent validity, infringement, and interference disputes. 35 U.S.C. § 294 (1988); 35
U.S.C. § 135(d) (1988). Cf. Diematic Mfg. Corp. v. Packaging Industries, Ina, 381 F. Supp. 1057(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
56. "If Congress did intend to limit or prohibit waiver of a judicial forum for a particular claim,
such an intent 'will be deducible from [the statute's] text or legislative history' or from an inherent
conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying purpose." McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227(citation omitted) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985)).
57. Id. at 226.
58. Id. at 227.
59. Swenson, 858 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1988), motion denied, reh'g denied, 872 F.2d 264 (8th Cir.
1989), cen denied, 110 S. Ct. 143 (1989). Before Swenson, no federal court had ever decided the
arbitrability of state antidiscrimination claims in the commercial arbitration context. Although several
recent Supreme Court cases dealing with the FAA boldly affirmed and endorsed the arbitration of
federal and state statutory rights, see supra note 34, none of these cases dealt with arbitration of
employment discrimination claims. See also Brief for Appellant at ii, Swenson v. Management
Recruiters Int'l Inc., 858 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-5465-MN) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief].
60. See supra text accompanying notes 34-52.
1990]
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parallel state statutes are not subject to binding arbitration under the FAA 6'
Management Recruiters International 62 ("MRI") employed Deborah Swenson
as a manager in one of its subsidiary employment agencies. Prior to beginning
work for MRI, Swenson signed an employment agreement which contained a
broad arbitration clause.0 Subsequently, Swenson claimed that her supervisor
violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act" by: (1) sexually harassing her
during her employment,6 and (2) ordering her not to hire black employees.6
Swenson sued her supervisor and MRI in district court.L Both defendants
moved to staysroceedings pending arbitration of all issues pursuant to section
3 of the FAA. The district court granted the defendants' motion on all of the
61. Swenson, 858 F.2d 1304.
62. Management Recruiters International is a company specializing in personnel placement and
is a wholly-owned subsidiary of CDI Corporation.
63. The arbitration clause read as follows:
10. Arbitration
(a) Except as provided in Subsection 10(b) hereo all controversies, claims,
disputes and matters in question arising out of, or relating to, this Agreement
or the breach thereof, or the relations between the parties, shall be decided by
arbitration in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association. The parties agree that the arbitration shall take
place in Clevelan4 Ohio, and shall be governed by the law of the State of Ohio.
The award rendered by the arbitrator shall be final and judgment may be
entered upon it in accordance with applicable law in any court having jurisdic-
tion thereof, including a federal district court, pursuant to the Federal
Arbitration Act. The arbitrator may grant the Company injunctive relief,
including mandatory injuctive [sic] relief, in order to protect the rights of the
Company pursuant to sections 5, 6, and 7 hereof, but shall not be limited to
such relief. The parties specifically agree that this provision for arbitration shall
not preclude the Company from seeking injunctive relief in a court in order to
protect its rights under said section 5, 6, and 7, nor shall the filing of such an
action constitute waiver by the Company of its right to seek arbitration hereun-
der. In preparation for the arbitration hearing, each party may utilize all
methods of discovery authorized by the Ohio rules of Civil Procedure, and may
enforce the right to such discovery in the manner provided by said Rules and/or
by the Ohio Arbitration Law.
(b) The right of the Company to terminate this agreement shall not be subject
to arbitration.
Appellant's Brief, supra note 59, at (A)35-36 (emphasis in original).
64. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West 1966 & Supp. 1990).
65. Swenson alleged that the harassment created a "hostile environment" which caused her to
terminate her employment with MRI. This type of harassment is recognized as a form of sex
discrimination. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). See generally Monat &
Gomez, Sexal Harasment. The Impact of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vison on Grievance and
Arbitration Decisions, 41 Atm. J. 24 (Dec. 1986).
66. Subdivision 6(2) of the Minnesota Human Rights Act prohibits aiding and abetting
employment discrimination. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 subd. 6(2).
67. Swenson v. CDI Corp., 670 F. Supp. 1438 (D. Minn. 1987). Section 363.14 subd. 1(a) of
the Minnesota Human Rights Act permits the victim of discrimination to bypass administrative
proceedings and file suit directly in district court.
68. 9 U.S.C. § 3. This section requires the court to order a stay of proceedings when
presented with an issue referable to arbitration under a valid arbitration agreement.
[Vol. 27
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claims.69
Swenson appealed, claiming that the district court erred in finding the sex and
race discrimination claims arbitrable. Specifically, she argued that judicial
remedies provided under the Minnesota Human Rights Act were not preempted
by the FAA1 0 Accepting Swenson's argument, the Eighth Circuit reversed that
part of the district court's order which granted a stay of the two state employ-
ment discrimination claims. Relying on Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 71 a
1974 Supreme Court case, the Swenson court held that the text and legislative
history of Title VII indicated that Congress intended to preserve a judicial forum
for violations of both Title VII and parallel state statutory rights?2
In Alexander,73 the Supreme Court considered the arbitrability of a Title VII
race discrimination claim pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.74 A
unanimous Court in Alexander plainly rejected the idea that prior submission of
a discrimination claim to arbitration pursuant to a grievance arbitration clause
in a collective bargaining agreement would bar a subsequent suit under TitleVII.7s
69. Swenson v. CDI Corp., 670 F. Supp. 1438 (D. Minn. 1987).
70. Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1305.
71. Almxander, 415 U.S. 36. See infra text accompanying notes 73-86.
72. Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1309.
73. Alexander, 415 U.S. 36. In Aleander, a black union employee claimed his discharge was
racially motivated and submitted his complaint under the grievance arbitration procedure provided
in the collective bargaining agreement. The agreement contained a broad arbitration clause and also
an antidiscrimination clause. Prior to the arbitration hearing, the employee filed a charge of racial
discrimination with the state civil rights commission. The state agency referred the complaint to the
EEOC. After investigating the complaint, the EEOC found no 'easonable cause to believe that the
charge was true." The EEOC dismissed the complaint and issued Alexander a right-to-sue notice in
federal court. See infra note 134.
This is the first time the United States Supreme Court considered the arbitrability of Title VII
claims. See generally Carmell & Westercamp, supra note 19 (for a discussion of the development of
Alexander and its potential impact on present discrimination arbitration).
In 1981, the Supreme Court extended its Alexander nonwaiver rule in Barrentine, 450 U.S. 728
(holding that prior submission of FLSA claims to arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement does not preclude subsequent judicial resolution). Again, in 1984, the Supreme Court
extended its Alxander nonwaiver rule in McDonald, 466 U.S. 284 (holding that prior submission of
a civil rights claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 to arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement does not preclude final resolution of the claim in court). More recently, in 1987, the
Supreme Court reinforced the validity of Alexander, Barrentine, and McDonald in Atchison, T. &
S.F.R. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557 (1987) (holding that prior submission of a claim under the Railway
Labor Act did not deprive the employee of his right to bring an action under the Federal Employer's
Liability Act).
Most courts have rejected the argument that Mitsubishi and McMahon limit the effect ofAlexander.
Udey, 883 F.2d at 186 ('the Court has done nothing to disturb its prior ruling in Alexander.. .. );
Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 224 ('Nothing in Mitsubishi or Shearson suggests that the Court was overruling
its prior holdings [in Alexander, Barentine, and McDonald] .... '"; Alford, 712 F. Supp. at 548
("NeitherShearson norMitsubishi overrulesAiender."); DeSapio, 143 Misc. 2d at 611,540 N.Y.S.2d
at 935 (Alexander is not in conflict with the ruling in Mitsubishi.).
74. See supra note 1.
75. Because of the Supreme Court's overwhelming approval of arbitration in the union context,
this decision was well-publicized. See Edwards, Arbitration of Employrnent Discrimination Cases: An
EmpiricalStudy, 1975 PROC 28H ANN. mG NAT. AcAD. ARB. 59,59. The Steelworker's Trilogy
reflects the federal policy favoring arbitration of union-labor disputes. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. 593;
Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. 574; United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
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The Alexander Court reasoned that federal courts were ultimately responsible
for enforcing Title VII, not arbitrators whose decisions are binding.76 The
Court stressed that the private cause of action plays a central role in Title VII's
enforcement scheme.n In addition, the Alexander Court examined the legisla-
tive history of Title VII and found that Title VII "manifests a congressional
intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title
VII and other applicable state and federal statutes."78 Also, the Court reasoned
that Alexander's contractual right to arbitrate was independent of his statutory
rights under Title VII.7 9
Finally, the Alexander Court offered several reasons why arbitration is not an
appropriate forum for resolving Title VII claims.8° First, the arbitrator's role
is limited to interpreting the contract, not to applying laws.81 Second, arbitra-
tors are not competent to resolve complex discrimination disputes.Y The
Alexander Court stressed that courts hold the primary responsibility for resolving
statutory issues. 3 Third, the factfinding process in arbitration is usually not as
complete as judicial factfinding. 4 Finally, "[a]rbitrators have no obligation..
. to give their reasons for an award.""s
(1960).
76. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 45; Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1305.
77. Title VII does not provide the EEOC with direct powers of enforcement. The EEOC's
enforcement power is restricted to engaging in conference, conciliation, and persuasion. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-4(g). In utilizing Title VII's procedure, "the private litigant not only redresses his own injury
but also vindicates the important congressional policy against discriminatory employment practices."
Alexander, 415 U.S. at 45.
78. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 48 (footnote omitted); Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1308.
79. The Court in Aleander distinguished contract rights from statutory rights:
In submitting his grievance to arbitration, an employee seeks to vindicate his
contractual right.... By contrast, in filing a lawsuit under Title VII, an employee
asserts independent statutory rights accorded by Congress. The distinctly separate
nature of these contractual and statutory rights is not vitiated merely because both were
violated as a result of the same factual occurrence. And certainly no inconsistency
results from permitting both rights to be enforced in their respectively appropriate
forums.
Moreover, a contractual right to submit a claim to arbitration is not displaced simply
because Congress also has provided a statutory right against discrimination. Both rights
have legally independent origins and are equally available to the aggrieved employee.
Alexander, 415 U.S. at 49-50, 52.
80. Id at 57-58. TheAlexander Court referred to its decision in Wdko, 346 U.S. at 435-37, as
a basis for its reasoning. See supra note 44.
81. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56-57. Traditionally, the arbitrator is confined to interpret contract
terms and need not apply law outside of the contract. I at 53-54.
82. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57 & n.18; Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1306 & n.6.
83. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57.
84. Id. at 57-58 (The Alexander Court noted that the record of arbitration is not complete,
rules of evidence are not applied, and common trial procedures are not available.); Swenson, 858 F.2d
at 1306-07 & n.7.
85. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 58 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 574, 598 (1960)); Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1307 n.7.
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After considering the independent nature of Title VII rights, the legislative
history of Title VII, and the inappropriateness of resolving complex Title VII
claims in arbitration, the Alexander Court concluded that "the federal policy
favoring arbitration of labor disputes and the federal policy against discriminato-
ry employment practices can best be accommodated by permitting an employee
to pursue fully both his remedy under the grievance-arbitration clause of a
collective-bargaining agreement and his cause of action under Title VII.V8
The Swenson court was persuaded by the Court's reasoning in Alexander and
concluded that Congress did not intend employment arbitration agreements
enforceable under the FAA to supplant federal judicial proceedings under Title
VIL87 The Eighth Circuit adopted the Alexander Court's mistrust of arbitration
and concluded "arbitration is poorly suited as a forum for the final resolution of
rights created by Title VII"s because arbitration would not address the
important public policy embodied in Title VII.9 The Swenson court ignored
the recent Supreme Court decisions holding that the FAA preempts both state
and federal remedies9° because none of these cases involved employment
discrimination. 91 The Swenson court reasoned that "'different considerations
apply where the employee's claim is based on rights arising out of a statute
designed to provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual workers."92
After deciding Alexander applied,93 the Swenson court then had to determine
86. A/eander, 415 U.S. at 59-60. In addition, theAiewnder Court provided lower courts with
discretion to admit the arbitral decision as evidence and to accord it appropriate weight depending
on the arbitrator's consideration of Title VII rights. Id at 60 n.21. However, the Court still warned
that "courts should ever be mindful that Congress, in enacting Title VII, thought it necessary to
provide a judicial forum for the ultimate resolution of discriminatory employment claims." Id But
see Silver, In Lieu of Preclusion: ReconcilingAdninistradve Decisionmaking and Federal Civil Rights
Claims, 65 IND. L-. 367 (1990) (arguing that courts should give preclusive effect to agency
determinations in subsequent litigation under any federal civil rights statute).
87. Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1306.
88. Id
89. Id at 1306-07.
90. See supra note 34; Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (holding claims for wages under
the California Labor Code arbitrable because the FAA preempted a California statute invalidating
agreements to arbitrate wage collection cases); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding
claims under the California Franchise Investment Law arbitrable because the FAA preempted
provision in the California law invalidating arbitration clauses).
91. Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1306.
92. Id (quoting Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 737 (1981)).
93. The defendants argued that Alesander did not apply because it involved a collective
bargaining agreement not subject to the FAA whereas Swenson involved a commercial arbitration
agreement binding under the FAA. Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1306; Brief for Appellee's at 22, id (No.
87-5465-MN) C'the reasoning of Alexander should not be mechanically applied here."). Accord
Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 233 (Becker, J., dissenting); PihI v. Thomson McKinnon Securities, 48 F.E.P.
Cas. 922,926 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (findingAlmander applied only to cases involving collectively bargained
rights, not individually bargained agreements); Cf Baker v. Aubry, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1259, 265 Cal.
Rptr. 381 (1989) (the reasoning in Barrentine does not apply in privately negotiated arbitration
agreements).
The Swenson court rejected this argument explaining that the Court in Alexander focused on the
"unique nature of Title VIP' rather than the fact that a collective bargaining agreement was involved.
Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1306. See Lieberman, supra note 3, at 1820 (Alexander, Barrentine, and
McDonald "may be read to support the proposition that discrimination cases generally should be
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whether Congress intended to preserve a judicial forum for state anti-
discrimination claims as well. The Swenson court found two anti-preemption
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("the Act") persuasive in determining
the important role state law plays in the Title VII scheme.94 In addition to the
text of the Act, the Swenson court examined the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the states' role in enforcing Title VII.95 The Swenson court
treated different from cases arising in commercial contexts when a court is determining arbitrability.")
See also Utley, 883 F.2d at 187 CThe fact that [the plaintiff] signed an individual employment agree-
ment rather than a collective bargaining agreement as in Alerander is not significant.'); Alford, 712
F. Supp. at 548-49 (relying on Swenson in holding that Alexander has not been impliedly overruled
by the Supreme Court's recent decisions; thus, an employee's sex discrimination suit under Title VII
is entitled to a judicial forum notwithstanding a commercial agreement to arbitrate under the FAA);
DeSapio, 143 Misc. 2d at 611, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 935 (Aleander is not in conflict with the ruling in
Mitsublshi.). Cf Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 224, 229 (concluding that age discrimination claims arising
outside the collective bargaining context should be treated differently from those arising in
commercial contexts, preserving a judicial forum for discrimination claims).
94. Section 2000e-7 which applies only to Title VII of the Act provides:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any
liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of any State
other than any such law which purports to require or permit the doing of any act
which would be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter.
Section 2000h-4 applies to all titles of the Act and it provides:
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating an intent on the
part of Congress to occupy the field in which any such title operates to the exclusion of
State laws on the same subject matter, nor shall any provision of this Act be construed
as invalidating any provision of State law unless such provision is inconsistent with any of
the purposes of this Act, or any provision thereof.
Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1308.
95. Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 468-69 (1982) C'State anti-
discrimination laws... play an integral role in the congressional scheme). In Kremer, the Court
held that a state court decision upholding an administrative agency's rejection of a discrimination
claim must be given preclusive effect in a subsequent action in federal court. In ascertaining the
interaction of state law in the Title VII scheme, the Kremer Court summarized the enforcement
scheme of Title VII as follows:
Whenever an incident of alleged employment discrimination occurs in a State or locality
which by law prohibits such discrimination and which had established an "authority to
grant or seek relief from such [discrimination] or to institute criminal proceedings with
respect thereto," no charge of discrimination may be actively processed by the EEOC
until the state remedy has been invoked and at least 60 days have passed, or the state
proceedings have terminated. Only after providing the appropriate state agency an
opportunity to resolve the complaint may an aggrieved individual press his complaint
before the EEOC. In its investigation to determine whether there is reasonable cause
to believe that the charge of employment discrimination is true, the Commission is
required to "accord substantial weight to final findings and orders made by State and
local authorities in proceedings commenced under State or local law" pursuant to the
limited deferral provisions of § 706, but is not bound by such findings. If the EEOC
finds reasonable cause to believe that discrimination has occurred, it undertakes
conciliation efforts to eliminate the unlawful practice; if these efforts fail, the
Commission may elect to bring a civil action to enforce the Act. If the Commission
declines to do so, or if the Commission finds no reasonable cause to believe that a
violation has occurred, "a civil action" may be brought by an aggrieved individual.
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found that Congress contemplated a "prominent state law role" and a "mixed
federal-state scheme" allowing individuals the freedom to pursue their rights
under other "applicable state and federal statutes" as well as under Title VII.96
In finding that Congress clearly preserved the right to judicial remedies in
employment discrimination cases, and that Congress designed Title VII's
enforcement scheme to utilize state antidiscrimination systems when possible,97
the Swenson court reasoned that Congress also intended to preserve judicial
remedies for violations of state statutory rights parallel to Title VII. Thus, the
Swenson court concluded state discrimination claims were not subject to the
FAA 9
Notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court's overwhelming approval
of arbitrating statutory claims," Swenson was able to persuade the Eighth
Circuit that Congress did not intend arbitration to replace the judicial forum
provided by Title VII and parallel state statutes.
A Criticism of Swenson
The Swenson court made three mistakes. First, it failed to consider that the
Alexander reasoning no longer applies to arbitration of statutory rights, especially
in the commercial arbitration setting. Second, it failed to recognize the recent
Supreme Court decisions as controlling.1 0 Third, it failed tO recognize the
reality that the purpose of Title VII is frustrated when Title VII claims covered
by arbitration clauses are deferred first to a judicial forum.
The Swenson court erred in adopting the Alexander Court's reasoning, which
is clearly out of line with the current Supreme Court position on arbitration.101
In Alexander, the Court relied on the reasoning in Wilko v. Swan, a case which
has been recently overruled.1ta Thus, it is questionable whether the holding in
Kremer, 45 U.S. at 469 (citations omitted). See infra text accompanying notes 121-35. For a more
detailed discussion of the enforcement provisions of Title VII, see Commission on Civil Rights, supra
note 30, at 1195-1218.
96. Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1308 (footnote omitted).
97. Id. at 1308-09.
98. Id at 1309. The Swenson court stressed that its decision was based on the congressional
intent and legislative history of Title VIL
The court did not examine the legislative history of the Minnesota Human Rights Act to ascertain
the state legislature's intent in passing the state law. In bypassing a state law analysis, the court
distinguished Steck v. Smith Barney, Hanis Upham & Co., 661 F. Supp. 543 (D.N.J. 1987), where the
New Jersey district court held a state ADEA claim was subject to arbitration. The Steck court
reasoned that there was no congressional intent to exempt state age discrimination claims from
arbitration because no federal law was at issue. IM at 548. In reconciling this decision with Swenson's
similar state antidiscrimination claim, the Swenson court explained that race and gender discrimination
claims are treated differently from age discrimination claims as evidenced in the different Title VII
and ADEA enforcement schemes. For example, Title VII mandates deferral to qualified state
agencies whereas the ADEA does not. Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1309.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 34-52.
100. See supra tet accompanying notes 57-58.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 34-52.
102. Rodriguez de Quijas, 109 S. Ct. 1917. See supra note 54.
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Alexander is still valid when its reasoning is now outdated. The Supreme Court
and many commentators have rejected the Wilko and Alexander Courts' reasons
for defeating arbitration.' Moreover, the Alexander Court relied on outdated
assumptions about arbitrators-namely, that arbitrators lack expertise in handling
discrimination disputes.1t 4 The Swenson court adopted this assumption even
after the Supreme Court hailed the competence of arbitratorss
The Swenson court mechanically applied Alexander and rejected the recent
cases reflecting the contemporary view of arbitration."° The Swenson court
distinguished the recent Supreme Court decisions which applied the standard
because "none of these cases . . involved employment discrimination
claims."07  Yet, these cases are controlling because they directly address
arbitration of statutory rights under the FAA. To escape binding application of
the FAA, the current standard is clear. Congress must have intended to make
an exception to the FAA, and that the intent must be "discernable from the text,
history, or purposes of the statute."t33 Although the Swenson court arguably
applied the proper standard in reaching its decision, two facts put in question
the viability of Alexander in a modem commercial arbitration setting: (1)
Alexander is a labor arbitration case where the FAA did not apply;?and (2)
Alexander's reasoning is no longer sound. After Swenson, courts are split on
Alexander's validity in the commercial or discrimination context.' 9
103. See supra text accompanying notes 34-52. See also supra note 93.
104. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 34-52.
106. Id.
107. Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1306 (footnote omitted). See supra note 34.
108. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227. See supra text accompanying note 58.
109. See cases cited supra note 93. Also, the Alexander Court's analysis of Title VII may have
failed to satisfy the Supreme Court test-that Congress evince a "contrary command" not to arbitrate
Title VII claims which is discernable from the text, history, or purpose of the statute. See supra text
accompanying note 57. Cf. Lieberman, supra note 3, at 1853-54 (arguing that under the FAA,
discrimination claims should not be treated the same as claims involving routine commercial
transactions).
Arguably, there is no "contrary command" because the 68th Congress never mentioned the FAA
or arbitration in the text of Title VII or in the 7,000 plus pages of the Congressional Record.
STATUToRY HisroRY OF THE UNrrED STATES. CtvIL RiGHTs, PART II 1089 (B. Schwartz ed. 1970).
The absence of discussion probably does not prove a "contrary command." The FAA was enacted
in 1925, followed by the Civil Rights Act in 1964. By failing to mention arbitration or incorporate
it in its scheme, Congress probably did not intend to disturb its policies or its operation.
This interpretation is consistent with "evolutive constructivism," a practical theory of statutory
construction which demonstrates "the greatest promise for effecting sound interpretation. . . ." Fish,
The Only Gam in Town: An Introduction to Interpretive Theory, Statutory Construction, and Legslative
Histories, 88 KAN. L. REv. 815, 860 (1990). Evolutive constructivism recognizes that oftentimes,
"particular legislative intention does not manifest itself clearly from the statutory language or
legislative history.... This is especially the case when the legislature did not anticipate a particular
set of circumstances or conditions and there is no single, clear understanding of the statutes
application to those unanticipated situations." Id. at 850. This method "views the statute as a living,
evolving document [and] permits judges to view statutes through the prism of their understanding of
the current context." Id. at 857. In sum, evolutive constructivists recognize "the frequent nacessity
of interpreting a statute in accord with evolving societal and legal conditions." Id at 853.
Applying this interpretative theory to Title VII is appropriate because "the text is ambiguous and
the intent expressed in the legislative history has been overtaken by subsequent events... :P Id at
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Finally, the Swenson court erroneously concluded that arbitration is unable to
serve the public interest and that arbitration may hinder efforts to assist victims
of discrimination.1 Arbitration is just as capable of providing a fair, respon-
sive forum as a court. The purpose for providing a judicial forum for Title VII
claims is to help the individual grievant vindicate important rights. However, in
reality, Title VII procedures more often than not provide headaches rather than
assistance.' The current backlog at the EEOC and the crowded court dockets
actually discourage victims of discrimination from seeking relief under Title
VII."2 In contrast to delayed litigation, arbitration could assist discrimination
victims by facilitating a fair and speedy resolution of discrimination claims.
The Swenson decision reintroduced the notion that arbitration is an inferior
forum for resolving statutory rights. Lower federal and state courts are
embracing Swenson as the appropriate guide without considering the outdated
reasoning which supports its holding." 3 However, there are some fundamental
gaps which need to be addressed before Swenson is considered sound law: (1)
whether old notions of judicial hostility should be tolerated in an era where
these views are obsolete; (2) whether Alexander is applicable in a modem
commercial arbitration context, or even a discrimination context; and (3) whether
preserving a judicial forum in every case where there is a valid, enforceable
arbitration agreement is the best way to achieve the purposes of Title VII.
Employers with fair, comprehensive arbitration policies should be concerned
with the precedent set by Swenson. To avoid the Swenson situation, Congress
and employers should take action to maximize the probability that a valid
employment arbitration agreement will result in final, binding arbitration of Title
VII and parallel state discrimination claims.
854. The "old judicial hostility toward arbitration' has crumbled, the backlog at the EEOC and the
overcrowded federal courts are frustrating prompt vindication of Title VII rights, and commercial
arbitration is increasingly encouraged as a favorable substitute for litigating statutory rights. Title VII
should be interpreted in light of these legal developments, which evolved subsequent to the enactment
of Title VII and theAhmeander decision. The Supreme Court should apply the evolutive constructivist
theory to resolve whetherAleander's analysis of Title VII is the appropriate reference for finding an
exception to the FAA because the Aleamder Court's evaluation of congressional intent may not be
sufficient to satisfy the threshold requirements necessary to defeat arbitration under the FAA.
110. Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1307. Accord Lieberman, supra note 3, at 1841-42 ("Cenforcing private
agreements to arbitrate ADEA claims, particularly those arising out of broad arbitration clauses in
employment contracts, represents a threat to fulfilling the purposes of the ADEA.").
111. See supra text accompanying note 25.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
113. Utley, 883 F.2d at 187 ("employee cannot waive prospectively her [Title VII] right to a
judicial forum at any time, regardless of the type of employment agreement she signs.");Alford, 712
F. Supp. 547 (plaintiff's Title VII sex discrimination claim is not subject to arbitration under the FAA
despite privately negotiated arbitration agreement); Anderson, 449 N.W.2d 468 (plaintiff's sex
discrimination claims under Minnesota Human Rights Act are arbitrable despite privately negotiated
arbitration agreement). Cf DeSapio, 143 Misc. 2d 611, 540 N.Y.S.2d 932 (plaintiff's state disability
discrimination claim is arbitrable because Title VII does not include disability;, thus, there is no
congressional intent to exempt the claim).
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND PROPOSALS
This Section suggests ways Congress, employers, and organizations can work
together to bridge the gap between Title VII and the FAA. Arbitration
procedures can be improved to protect victims of discrimination, and Title VII
can be amended to require arbitration when these procedures have been made
adequate. Congress and the business community should recognize that a balance
can be reached and take appropriate action.
A Congress' Role: Amend Title ViHAnd Empower
the EEOC to Oversee Arbitration
Title VII does not mention the FAA, nor does it expressly contemplate
arbitration in its scheme.1 Since the United States Supreme Court has never
decided whether the FAA mandates arbitration of Title VII and parallel state
discrimination claims,lu state and lower federal courts have been left with the
job of reconciling the intent of Congress in enacting the FAA and subsequently,
Title VII to determine whether Congress intended to preserve a judicial forum
for Title VII rights."6 This gap between the FAA and Title VII can be cured
by Congress. United States arbitration law is among the most progressive in the
world," 7 and Congress should be able to develop a way to protect workers
from employment discrimination without disturbing the strong policy favoring
arbitration." 8 An amendment to Title VII is one way Congress can respond.
Congress should take heed of the Supreme Court's direction and amend Title
VII to reflect the current trend of arbitrating statutory claims."9 With the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 before Congress,"9 now is the appropriate time to act.
114. See STATUTORY HisroRY OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 109, at 1089.
115. Lieberman, supra note 3, at 1833. Aewnder involved arbitration under the grievance-
arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement. See supra text accompanying notes 73-86.
116. See supra note 98.
117. Hoellering, supra note 53, at 89.
118. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 Cso long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate
its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial
and deterrent function."). Cf. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 231-44 (Becker, J., dissenting) (compelling
arbitration of ADEA claim would not conflict with the purposes of the ADEA).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 34-58.
The Federal Courts Study Committee recently made 100 recommendations to alleviate the federal
court's backlogged civil docket. One Commission recommendation suggests that alternative dispute
resolution play a more significant role in resolving disputes traditionally heard in federal courts. Culp,
supra note 25, at 64. Specifically, the Commission suggests that "Congress ... broaden the present
authorization for alternative dispute-resolution programs in the federal judiciary" to provide relief for
civil litigants. Cf Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 231 C'If [shifting arbitration of ADEA claims away from the
courts] ... is a result desired by Congress, we should wait for Congress to explicitly so state.).
120. S. 2104,101st Cong., 2d Seas., 136 CoNG. REc. S9896-S9970 (discussed in scattered parts)
(daily ed. July 18,1990). After much debate, Congress passed the bill, which President Bush vetoed.
The 101st Congress failed to override the veto, so the bill will be carried over to the 102d Congress
for consideration. CONG. INDEx, Oct. 26, 1990, at 1 (CCH). For the text of the bill, see 136 CONG.
Rmc., supra, at S9966-S9968.
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The following simplified explanation of Title VII's enforcement scheme is
necessary to provide the foundation for discussing the proposed amendment to
Title VII.
1. Title Vi's Present Enforcement Scheme. Under Title VII, a grievant may
file a discrimination charge with either the EEOC or a state agency qualified to
handle the claim.12t If the EEOC first receives the Title VII charge, it must
defer it to a qualified state 706 agency m  for sixty days.m Once the EEOC
has authority to process the claim,124 the EEOC notifies the employer of the
charge2 and conducts an investigation to determine whether there is "reason-
able cause to believe the charge is true."'2 The EEOC may dismiss a charge
at any point in the investigation if it finds no "reasonable cause to believe the
charge is true" and for various other reasons.Y However, when the EEOC
dismisses the charge, it must issue a right-to-sue notice which entitles the
complainant to sue in federal court.
If the EEOC finds there is "reasonable cause to believe the charge is true," it
will try to eliminate the discriminatory practice by engaging in "conference,
121. If a work-sharing agreement exists between the state agency and the EEOC, copies of all
charges are automatically sent to the other agency. The work-sharing agreement will dictate which
agency should initially process the charge. B. SHLEt & P. GROSSMAN, EmLOYMENT DSCRIMINATION
LAw 942 n.79 (2d ed. 1983 & Cum. Supp. 1983-85). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-S(b); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(c)
(revised as of July 1, 1990) ("[Tihe Commission shall endeavor to enter into agreements with 706
Agencies and other fair employment practice agencies to establish effective and integrated resolution
procedures. Such agreements may include, but need not be limited to, cooperative arrangements to
provide for processing of certain charges by the Commission, rather than by the 706 Agency during
the [exclusive sixty day processing period afforded to state agencies].').
122. These are state and local agencies which the EEOC determines have the proper jurisdiction
and enforcement authority to handle Title VII claims. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.70. However, the EEOC will
not defer a charge to a state 706 agency when the agency does not have subject matter jurisdiction
over the charge. For example, the state law may not prohibit the particular form of discrimination
or may not provide jurisdiction over the parties. B. SHIm & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 121, at 1024.
123. In the absence of a work-sharing agreement, the EEOC can only process the claim when
either:. (1) the sixty day period expires; (2) the state agency waives its right to its exclusive sixty day
processing period; or (3) the state agency terminates its proceedings on the claim. 29 CF.R. §
1601.13(a)(4)(ii)(B). If no state agency exists with jurisdiction to process the charge, the EEOC may
begin processing the charge as long as it is timely filed. Id at § 1601.13(a)(1-2).
124. See supra note 123.
125. The notice must be issued within ten days after the filing date (the date when the EEOC
has authority to process the claim). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.14(a).
126. 42 U.S.C. at § 2000e-5(b). "In determining whether reasonable cause exists, the
Commission shall accord substantial weight to final findings and orders made by State or local
authorities in proceedings commenced under State or local law pursuant to the requirements of
subsections (c) and (d) of this section." ME
127. The EEOC will dismiss the charge after investigation and examination of the charge if:
(1) on its face, the charge fails to state a claim under Title VII; (2) the charging party fails to
cooperate with the EEOC in obtaining information or in other matters; (3) the EEOC cannot locate
the charging party after reasonable effort; (4) the charge is not timely filed; (5) the charging party
refuses to accept a settlement offer from the employer which the EEOC determines is adequate to
remedy the charge; or (6) after investigation of the charge, the EEOC finds no reasonable cause to
believe the charge of discrimination is true. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.18 (a-f) & 1601.19(g).
128. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.18(e) & 1601.19(a). The federal action must be commenced within
ninety days of receiving the notice. Id. § 1601.28(e)(1).
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conciliation, and persuasion" with the employer m If the conciliation attempts
fail,130 the EEOC may elect to file a civil suit on behalf of the grievant1' The
EEOC will issue a right-to-sue notice in federal court if it decides not to bring
a civil suit against the employer.tm Also, the grievant may request a right-to-
sue notice in writing before the EEOC terminates the administrative process. 33
Finally, once the EEOC issues a right-to-sue notice,"M the grievant may file a
civil action in the appropriate federal court within ninety days after the receipt
of the notice.35
2. Summary of the Proposed Amendment to Title VIL Under the proposed
amendment, as set forth in Appendix A,136 Title VII's enforcement scheme
would remain basically the same.?7 The amendment would only affect
treatment of the charge once the individual is entitled to a right-to-sue
noticem Also, the amendment would only apply to employers and individuals
who negotiate a commercial arbitration agreement before the alleged discrimina-
129. Ia § 1601.24. If the EEOC and employer reach an acceptable resolution of the charge,
the conciliation agreement is reduced to a writing and the EEOC terminates processing the claim.
ILa
130. Id § 1601.25 (either the employer will not agree to a resolution acceptable to the EEOC,
or the employer makes conciliation unreasonably difficult).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.27. In cases involving charges against
government, government agencies, or political subdivisions, the case is referred to the Attorney
General who has the authority to file a civil suit on behalf of the grievant. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
132. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(b). After attempts at conciliation fail, the charge is forwarded to a
district EEOC office to determine whether litigation on behalf of the EEOC is recommended. If the
district office decides the case is not appropriate for litigation by the EEOC, the aggrieved receives
a right to sue notice. B. SHtLF & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 121, at 966.
133. The EEOC will issue a right-to-sue notice upon written request if the EEOC failed to file
a civil suit or enter into a conciliation agreement within 180 days from the date the charge is deemed
filed with the EEOC. 28 C.F.Rt § 1601.28(a)(1). Also, the EEOC will issue a right-to-sue notice
upon written request before the 180-day period expires if the EEOC determines that it will not be
able complete processing of the charge before the 180-day period expires. Id. § 1601.28(a)(2). The
United States Supreme Court has interpreted the statute in a way that requires the Commission to
issue a right-to-sue letter after the 180-day processing period expires "regardless of the posture of any
state proceedings." New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 65 n.5 (1980).
134. Issued when: (1) the EEOC dismisses the charge; (2) the charging party requests a right-to-
sue notice after the EEOC's 180-day processing period expires, or before the 180-day period expires
when the EEOC determines it will not be able to timely process it; (3) the EEOC makes a
determination of no reasonable cause; or (4) the EEOC determines there is reasonable cause,
attempts at conciliation fail, and the EEOC declines to litigate the claim on behalf of the aggrieved.
B. SHLE! & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 121, at 967.
135. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(e)(1). State agencies have similar administrative procedures and issue
right-to-sue notices, but for state court rather than for federal court litigation. An aggrieved who files
with both the state agency and the EEOC may receive a right-to-sue notice in both state and federal
court, and then may choose the best forum.
136. Appendix A contains a detailed text of the proposed amendment, not in statutory form.
This Comment discusses only an amendment to Title VII. However, federal and state statutes
protecting against discrimination in areas not covered by Title VII could be amended utilizing a
scheme similar to the one proposed in this Comment.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 121-35.
138. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
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tion takes place.'39
After the EEOC notifies an employer of a charge, an employer who wants to
enforce its arbitration agreement would submit to the EEOC a request-to-
arbitrate notice, along with proof of the arbitration agreement and other
documentation which pertains to the employer's arbitration policies. These
documents would become part of the grievant's permanent EEOC file. Once the
EEOC determines the grievant is entitled to a fight-to-sue notice, it would defer
the charge, accompanied by the request-to-arbitrate notice, to a special
arbitration department for a determination of whether a right-to-arbitrate notice
should be issued in the place of a right-to-sue notice. The EEOC arbitration
department would examine the employer's documentation to determine whether
the arbitration agreement, in the context of the employment contract and
company arbitration policies, satisfies the following statutory requirements:'"
1. The arbitration agreement contemplates resolution of discrimination
claims.
2. The arbitration agreement expressly permits the arbitrator to decide
statutory discrimination claims.
3. The arbitration agreement empowers the arbitrator to award the same
relief available under Title VII and similar state laws.
4. The arbitration agreement provides each party with the right to representa-
tion by counsel during the arbitration hearing.
5. The arbitration agreement provides the aggrieved party with a convenient
location to arbitrate the discrimination claim.
If the arbitration department finds that the above requirements are satisfied,
it would issue a right-to-arbitrate notice to both parties instead of a right-to-sue
notice. Along with the right-to-arbitrate notice, the EEOC would include a list
of EEOC-approved arbitrators from which both parties would be required to
select an arbitrator.
The EEOC would have discretion to withhold a right-to-arbitrate notice when
it determines: (1) the charge will require statutory construction of Title VII
which should be addressed by a court; (2) the charge involves important policy
issues which warrant resolution by a court; or (3) the charge involves an area of
employment discrimination where the law is not sufficiently developed to guide
the arbitrator.
Under the proposed scheme, the grievant would have an incentive to fie the
claim with the EEOC only when: (1) the employer failed to incorporate into its
agreement the minimum protections enumerated in the proposed amendment;
(2) resolution of the charge requires statutory construction, raises important
policy issues, or involves a case of first impression which a court should decide;
139. See supra note 1. There would be no reason to deny enforcement of the arbitration
agreement as long as the aggrieved made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his or her statutory right
to a judicial forum. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 52 & n.15.
140. For a more detailed outline of the proposed statutory requirements, see Appendix A.
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or (3) the grievant wants an agency investigation of the employer's discriminatory
practices. In all other cases, the grievant could anticipate the EEOC issuing a
right-to-arbitrate notice. If the arbitration agreement provides the minimum
statutory requirements for issuing a right-to-arbitrate notice and the charge does
not fall within one of the prescribed exceptions, the grievant would only delay
his or her arbitration of the dispute by filing a claim with the EEOC.4
In addition, the proposed amendment would encourage employers to adopt
arbitration procedures which satisfy the statutory scheme. Consequently, more
grievants would probably choose to bypass filing with the EEOC and resolve
their discrimination claims pursuant to their arbitration agreements. Ultimately,
the backlog of charges waiting for investigation at the EEOC and the dockets of
federal courts should get some relief
3. EEOC Powers and Duties. To implement this amended enforcement
scheme, the EEOC's powers and duties should be expanded. First, the EEOC
should be empowered to determine which charges qualify for arbitration under
the amended scheme. 1z Second, the EEOC should maintain area-specific lists
of qualified arbitrators to include with the right-to-arbitrate notices. Finally, the
EEOC should develop a model arbitration agreement which would satisfy the
amended statutory requirements.
B. Employers' Role: MakingArbitration A More Attractive Forum
The changing profile of the workforce is causing increased employee activity
in the discrimination area143 and employers are searching for better ways to
handle the mounting charges. As the law stands, a grievant can bypass
arbitration and pursue his or her discrimination claim in federal court under
Title VII, or in state court under similar state laws.144 A grievant may also
choose to initially arbitrate his or her claim pursuant to a private arbitration
141. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
142. Appendix B contains a detailed text of the proposed amendments to the Procedural
Regulations of the EEOC. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.01-.80 (revised as of July 1, 1990).
143. A. WESriN & A. FEuu, supra note 26, at 3. The following are some causes of this rising
employee activism:
1. Employees are more educated and assertive.
2. Companies are employing a higher proportion of minorities.
3. The value-oriented workers from the "baby-boom" generation expect fair treatment at wcrk and
resist "arbitrary" actions.
4. Modern workers are more concerned about protecting employment references because of the weak
job market. Employees would rather resolve disputes internally and retain their jobs.
5. In order to compete in a competitive market, companies are forced to cut back the work force,
which in turn, creates more wrongful termination disputes.
Ili
144. Sivenson, 858 F.2d at 1304; Alexander, 415 U.S. at 36. See Oubichon v. North American
Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 572-74 (9th Cir. 1973). See also Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665
F.2d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 1982) (The court expanded theAlender principle stating "[t]his same policy
argues in favor of permitting a Title VII claimant to recover even if he or she failed to exhaust any
contractual remedies."); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 714-15 (7th Cir. 1969).
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agreement, and then subsequently pursue his or her separate statutory right in
a judicial forum.145 Employers often complain that they must defend discrimi-
nation claims in two forums-first in arbitration, and then if the grievant is not
happy with the award, in court. 46 An employer who is committed to resolving
discrimination disputes internally must confront the threat of outside litigation
and compete with the agencies and courts to resolve the disputes. This requires
the employer to make arbitration an even more attractive forum for resolving
discrimination claims. 47
Since arbitration is purely a matter of contract,148 the employer has consider-
able control over the contents of the employment agreement, including the
arbitration clause. To encourage arbitration of discrimination claims, the
employer should provide as many of the procedural advantages and remedies
available under antidiscrimination statutes as possible. At the same time, the
employer would be increasing the probability that a court in a subsequent
proceeding would defer to the arbitration award.149  The closer the arbitral
forum resembles a court proceeding, the freer a court will be to defer to the
arbitrator's decision.uo
A company committed to arbitrating discrimination claims should adopt
company rules and procedures and refer to them in the employment contract.
Thus, if Congress does adopt an amendment like the one suggested in this
Comment,'5 ' the chances of the EEOC and state agencies issuing a right-to-
arbitrate notice will increase. Seven components, consistent with those
enumerated in the proposed amendment, are particularly important to a
company discrimination-arbitration policy.
First, the employer should insert an antidiscrimination clause in the employ-
145. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 54.
146. A 1984 survey of sixty-four companies revealed the corporate motivation behind developing
internal dispute resolution systems. Most companies surveyed were concerned about rising legal costs,
rising complaints filed outside the company, rising settlement amounts and court awards, and the
damage to the company image in publicized cases. A. WESIN & A. Fnlu, supra note 26, at 7. Thus,
"[a]n employer... has an incentive to make available the conciliatory and therapeutic processes of
arbitration which may satisfy an employee's perceived need to resort to the judicial forum, thus saving
the employer the expense and aggravation associated with a lawsuit." Alexander, 415 U.S. at 55.
147. In 1948, the American Arbitration Association attempted to promote this goal when it
developed Employment Dispute Resolution Rules to govern voluntary submission of employment
discrimination disputes to arbitration. See Coulson, Fair Treatmet: VoluntaryArbitradon ofEmployee
Claims, 24 ARB. J. 24 (1978). However, these rules are rarely used. Telephone interview with Dennis
Sharp, Regional Vice President, San Diego Office of the American Arbitration Association (Sept. 22,
1989).
148. Par-Knit Mills, Inc. v. Stockbridge Fabrics, 636 F.2d 51, 54 (3d Cir. 1980).
149. See supra note 86.
150. The prior arbitration award may not preclude a subsequent suit, but the award "may be
admitted as evidence and [may be] accorded such weight as the court deems appropriate."Aleaander,
415 U.S. at 60 n.21. For a contrary view, see Silver, supra note 86, proposing that agency
determinations should create presumptions and alter burdens of proof rather than preclusion in
subsequent court actions.
151. See Appendix A, bnfra.
1990]
23
Hillock: Arbitration of Title VII and Parallel State Discrimination Claims
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1990
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
ment agreement" which incorporates the protective and remedial language of
state antidiscrimination statutes, and in the alternative, Title VII.153  This
measure serves two purposes: (1) it puts employees on notice that their
statutory right to be free from discrimination is part of the contract, and that
they can expect their discrimination claims to be arbitrated according to a state
or federal statute; and (2) it provides authority and reference for the arbitrator
to decide the statutory claim. If the statutory language is made a part of the
contract, the arbitrator will defer to the contract terms specifying the controlling
antidiscrimination statute in order to effectuate the intent of the parties. Also,
the arbitration clause should grant the arbitrator explicit power to resolve the
discrimination claim by reference to the state statute or Title VII. ' 4  This
express grant confirms the parties' intent that discrimination claims will be
arbitrated, and frees the arbitrator to consider the statutory claim fully without
fear of judicial review for exceeding the scope of the contract.55
Second, the arbitration agreement should not limit the arbitrator's power to
award statutory remedies. 6 The availability of remedies will often determine
which forum the grievant chooses.5 7  Thus, granting the arbitrator broad
152. "Where the collective-bargaining agreement contains a nondiscrimination clause similar to
Title VII, and where arbitral procedures are fair and regular, arbitration may well produce a
settlement satisfactory to both employer and employee." Alexander, 415 U.S. at 55.
153. The state law should be the primary reference in the contract because Title VII's scheme
appeals to state laws and agencies to first handle the discrimination claim. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 122-23. Title VII should be the secondary reference if the state law does not cover the type
of discrimination alleged and Title VII does. Cf Newman, supra note 16, at 51 C'All collective
bargaining agreements should contain a clear, express provision for the application by the arbitrator
of Title VII and other federal, state, and local statutes, regulations, guidelines, and decisions of courts
and administrative agencies thereunder, according to the same weight and deference as a court
would.").
154. See R. COULSON, BusiNEss ARBrnRAiON, supra note 16, at 21 C'[The arbitrator must
conform to the standards of justice as expressed in statutes and common law."). See also Newman,
supra note 16, at 49. This commentator stressed the importance of empowering arbitrators to apply
antidiscrimination statutes as follows:
If arbitrators refuse to apply Title VII ... and other federal, state, and local laws in
resolving discrimination disputes, it will be impossible for anyone to contend seriously
that arbitration is either a desirable or even an appropriate forum for the resolution of
such disputes. We believe the importance of arbitration as the desirable and
appropriate forum far outweighs any consideration that might be used in favor of
arbitrators' not applying these statutes.
Id
155. A court may vacate an arbitration award if "the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made." 9 U.S.C. § 10(d).
156. The AAA's Commercial Arbitration Rules provide the arbitrator with broad remedial
power. The Scope of Award Rule provides: '"he arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that the
arbitrator deems just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the parties, including,
but not limited to, specific performance of a contract." AAA Rule 43. See Newman, supra note 16,
at 47 (To be acceptable, an award resolving an issue of discrimination ... must conform to the
principles of equality set forth in Title VII ..... D.
157. 'The caliber of the awards that arbitrators are making in discrimination cases... will be
decisive in determining whether arbitration will prevail or the courts will take over." R. COULSON,
BUSINESS ARBITRATION, supra note 16, at 21.
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powers to fashion relief pursuant to the state statute or Title VII would increase
the likelihood that the grievant will choose arbitration over the time-consuming
and costly Title VII process. Under Title VII, remedies are generally limited to
back pay, injunctive relief,'58 and attorney's fees.'59 However, under state
statutes, punitive and emotional damages are often available.'t  Although
punitive damages are normally not awarded in arbitration, 6' the growing trend
is for courts to confirm arbitration awards which include punitive damages'
62
158. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). This section provides: "[i]f the court finds that the respondent has
intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in
the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful practice, and
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to,
reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay... :" See Williams v. Owens-Illinois,
Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 931 (9th Cir. 1982) C'Congress has granted broad equitable powers to enable the
courts to fashion the most complete relief possible."). Despite this seemingly broad power, courts
limit awards to back pay and injunctive relief. See Bohen v. East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1184 (7th
Cir. 1986) (a district court cannot award compensatory or punitive damages to redress a violation of
Title VII). Cf Commission on Civil Rights, supra note 30, at 1253 ('The possible financial rewards,
back pay less interim earnings, are inadequate to cover [the] delay as well as the trouble and expense
of litigation."). See also Walker, Tie VI: Complaint and Enforcement Procedures and Relief and
Remedies, 7 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REv. 495 (1966).
The Civil Rights Act of 1990, however, would have provided for compensatory and punitive
damages. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess, 136 CONG R c. S9967 (daily ed. July 18, 1990).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). This section provides that "[i]n any action or proceeding under
[Title VII] the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee
as part of the costs." Id. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (The
Supreme Court instructed that "one who succeeds in obtaining an injunction under that Title should
ordinarily recover attorney's fees unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.").
The Civil Rights Act of 1990 would also provide for expert fees and other litigation expense. S. 2104,
101st Cong., 2d Sess, 136 CONG RE. S9967 (daily ed. July 18, 1990).
160. See ag., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.071. In addition to remedies available under Title VII,
the Minnesota Human Rights Act provides relief for mental anguish and distress caused by the
discrimination, and provides three times the complainant's special damages. Also, punitive damages
are allowed and a civil penalty may be awarded to the state's general revenue fund. Id.
161. See M. DoMKE, supra note 1 § 33.03 (An award for punitive damages is void as against
public policy and will not be enforced.). But see cases cited, infra note 162, Anderson v. Nichols, 359
S.E.2d 117, 121 (W. Va. 1987) (The court upheld what might be called punitive damages and
reasoned that "[a]rbitrators, like courts, are entitled to award punitive damages in appropriate
circumstances as compensation of oppressive conduct."); Baker v. Sadick, 162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 208
Cal. Rptr. 676 (1984) (affirming an arbitrators award of $300,000 for a medical malpractice claim).
162. See Perna, Punitive Damages and Public Policy, 1986 ARBrRATION & THE LAW 35, 35
(AAA General Counsel's Report). Consistent with the trend toward expanding arbitration, many
federal and state courts are permitting arbitration awards including punitive damages where the
arbitration clause is broad, or where the parties expressly agree to such a remedy. Id 'There is no
public policy bar which prevents arbitrators from considering claims for punitive damages." Id at 38
(quoting Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353, 361 (N.D. Ala.
1984)). See also Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Systems, Inc., 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989) (The
court confirmed an award of punitive damages granted pursuant to American Arbitration Association
rules providing broad powers to fashion relief); Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378
(11th Cir. 1988) (punitive damage award upheld absent any express prohibition on awarding punitive
damages); Ehrich v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 675. F. Supp. 559,565 (W.D.S.D. 1987) C'the strong
federal policy in favor of upholding an arbitrator's ability to fashion appropriate remedies" permits
arbitrators to award punitive damages); Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598
F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ala. 1984), aff'a 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985) (punitive damage award upheld
in a construction dispute under a broad arbitration clause).
Recently, an arbitrator granted $38.2 million in damages arising out of an employment contract
dispute. One million of the award was punitive damages. Siconolfi, Former Officer of Kenper Unit
Wins Big Award, Wall St. J., May 4, 1990, at A4, col. 1.
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Third, the grievant must have the option to have counsel present at the
arbitration hearing.16 The grievant will feel more confident that his or her
rights will be fully considered if an attorney presents the evidence. The right to
counsel also ensures that the arbitrator will be presented with adequate factual
information, and applicable statutory and case law.
Fourth, the company could offer to cover the cost of arbitration to encourage
employees to first submit the discrimination claim to arbitration. In addition to
saving litigation costs, absorbing the cost of arbitration may indirectly boost
employee morale because employees would feel the employer is genuinely
concerned about possible violations of the discrimination policy. Covering
arbitration costs would also promote a discrimination-free workplace because
more employees would present their claims to management if they have nothing
to lose. As a result, the employer would be more aware of existing discriminato-
ry practices and would be in a better position to remedy the situation before the
practice affects more employees and generates more claims.
Fifth, the employer must make sure that the location of the arbitration hearing
is convenient.' Sixth, the arbitrators should be lawyers with special expertise
in the field of employment discrimination. 165 This measure is needed to ensure
that the arbitrator's decision is based on sound judgment and current legal
principles. The grievant, with the advice of his or her lawyer, should be granted
discretion in choosing the arbitrator. Finally, the employer should frequently
inform its employees about the company arbitration policy.1'
1. Organizations' Role: Ensuring Quality of Arbitrators. Ensuring the quality
of arbitrators in the discrimination area is an important step towards protecting
the grievant's rights at an arbitration hearing. Organizations such as the
American Arbitration Association (AAA),167 National Association for the
163. The AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules provide for representation by counsel (AAARule
22). See Carmell & Westercamp, supra note 19, at 32 (The appointment of independent counsel
selected by the aggrieved employee would ... appear to go a long way toward meeting judicial con-
cerns."t).
164. In Swenson, the employment agreement required that Swenson travel to Cleveland, Ohio,
740 miles from her home in Minnesota, to arbitrate her claim. Appellants Brief, supra note 59, at
22.
165. See supra note 29. Arbitrators not being lawyers concerned the Court in both Alexander
and Barrentin Alerander, 415 U.S. at 57 n.18; Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 743 n.21.
166. One company informed its employees about a new company complaint procedure by
inserting a copy of the procedure with paychecks. Russell, The EEO Complaint System at Chicago
and North Western Transportation Company, in A. WESMIN, & A. FEtau, supra note 26, at 147.
Motorola Inc. and Cigna circulate in-house alternative dispute resolution newsletters to their
managers and have developed ADR training manuals for employees. Jacob, Controlling Costs with
a Neutral Third Party, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1990, at F12, col. 6.
167. The American Arbitration Association already maintains a listing of specialized arbitrators
and provides the listing upon request to parties utilizing its rules. 'Biographies of neutral
[arbitrators], cross-indexed by occupation, special qualifications, and geographic availability, are
maintained in the AAA's computerized network for submission to the parties." A .IVCAN
ARBrIRATION ASSOCIATION, RESOLVING YouR DISPutS 7 (1989). 'The AAA's panel consists of expert
and knowledgeable neutrals from many professions and industries." Id at 6. The AAA's listing
includes nonlawyers. Id at 6-7.
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Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and National Organization of
Women (NOW) could generate and update lists of qualified arbitrators who have
specialized competence and experience in the area of employment discrimina-
tion.t68 The organizations should make these lists available to employers and
employees for reference when choosing an arbitrator. The arbitrators listed
should be lawyers' 69 who are familiar with the current status of the law.
CONCLUSION
Arbitration has survived years of criticism to evolve into a convenient
alternative to litigation. The Supreme Court's recent decisions put to rest any
suggestion that arbitration is an inferior forum for resolution of statutory claims.
Private businesses, arbitration organizations, and government should take heed
of the Supreme Court's gradual progression away from preserving a judicial
forum for statutory rights, and prepare for an increased responsibility in
resolving disputes derived from both state and federal statutes--specifically Title
VII and parallel state statutes. Furthermore, the courts should purge the system
of the lingering remnants of judicial hostility toward arbitration reflected in
decisions like Wdko, Alexander, and Swenson. Congress should step in and
amend Title VII to facilitate this process.
This Comment challenges Congress to integrate arbitration into the Title VII
scheme, and challenges the business community to make arbitration clauses
mean something more than an illusory statement of intent. When a binding
arbitration agreement adequately protects the employee's rights, the employee
should be bound by the agreement. However, it is imperative that individuals
who are compelled to arbitrate their discrimination claims are assured that their
statutory rights will be protected in arbitration. The proposals suggested in this
Comment should achieve this goal. If Congress and employers do make the
suggested changes, individuals like Valerie' 70 will choose to avail themselves of
the benefits of arbitration rather than proceed through delay-ridden Title VII
procedures.
Laura R Hillock*
168. See generaly Newman, supra note 16, at 37-38 (also proposing cooperation with organiza-
tions to facilitate arbitration of discrimination claims in the collective bargaining context).
169. See supra note 29. But see id. at 50 CQIhe necessity that arbitrators apply appropriate legal
principles in no wise means that arbitrators should be lawyers.).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
* The author wishes to thank Marie Backes for her ideas, comments, and suggestions in the
early stages of drafting, and Stacy Running, for her wonderful edits. Special thanks to my husband,
Tim, for his love, encouragement, and support along the way.
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APPENDIX A. Proposed Amendment to Title VII
The following is a model amendment, not in statutory form, which could be
incorporated into Title VII.
Charges Governed by Valid Arbitration Agreements
1. The purpose of this section is to respect and enforce valid arbitration
agreements governing the aggrieved party's discrimination claims.
2. Any employer who receives notice of a discrimination charge from the
Commission pursuant to section 2000e-5(b)m  may submit a request-to-
arbitrate to the Commission if the employer executed a valid arbitration
agreement with the aggrieved party. The request must be received by the
Commission within thirty days after the notice of the charge is received by the
employer. The request shall include a copy of the arbitration agreement and any
other documentation relating to the company policies and procedures for
arbitrating discrimination claims. In connection with any request-to-arbitrate
under this section, the employer must cooperate with the Commission in
obtaining any additional information in the same manner as required under
section 20OOe-8. 172 The request-to-arbitrate will become part of the aggrieved's
file.
3. If the Commission determines that the aggrieved is entitled to receive a
right-to-sue notice, the Commission shall consider the employer's request-to-
arbitrate before issuing a right-to-sue notice. The Commission shall identify
whether arbitration under the arbitration agreement will satisfy the following
conditions:
a. The arbitration agreement contemplates resolution of discrimination claims
by making reference to Title VII or a similar state statute.
b. The arbitration agreement expressly permits the arbitrator to decide
statutory discrimination claims.
c. The arbitration agreement empowers the arbitrator to award the same
relief available under Title VII and equivalent state laws.
d. The arbitration agreement provides each party with the right to representa-
tion by counsel during the arbitration hearing.
171. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
172. I § 2000e-8. This section governs the scope and manner of Commission investigations.
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e. The arbitration agreement provides the aggrieved party with a convenient
location to arbitrate his or her discrimination claim.
4. If the Commission determines that all of the conditions in section 3 (a-e)
would be satisfied in arbitration, the Commission must issue a right-to-arbitrate
notice enforceable by the courts of the United States unless the Commission
determines that resolution of the discrimination claim would involve (i) novel
statutory construction of Title VII, (ii) important policy issues, or (iii) a case of
first impression which requires resolution by a court. In these cases, the
Commission shall issue a right-to-sue notice in federal court.
5. The Commission shall send the right-to-arbitrate notice to both parties.
The notice shall include a list of qualified arbitrators within the state where the
arbitration hearing will be held. The parties to the arbitration agreement must
choose an arbitrator from the Commission's list or obtain independent approval
from the Commission to employ an arbitrator not named on the list.
6. Arbitration awards concerning discrimination claims are final and binding
on the parties. The district court may vacate an award upon application of the
parties pursuant to section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act.' When a party
seeks to vacate an award on a charge first processed by the Commission under
this section, and the award was rendered by an unapproved arbitrator, the district
court shall direct a rehearing by a Commission approved arbitrator before
reviewing the arbitration award.
173. 9 U.S.C. § 10. See supra note 23.
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APPENDIX B: Proposed Amendments to EEOC Regulations
The following are model amendments to the Procedural Regulations of the
EEOC74 which should be implemented to clarify the EEOC's expanded powers
and duties under the proposed amendment to Title VII.
Right-to-Arbitrate Determinations
1. To expedite resolution of discrimination claims, the Commission may
establish a special division to handle charges submitted with requests-to-
arbitrate. The Commission may delegate the responsibility to determine whether
the conditions set forth in sections 1-5 of the Arbitration Amendment to Title
VII warrant issuance of a right-to-arbitrate notice or a right-to-sue notice. The
department making these determinations must refer to the Federal Arbitration
Act and other relevant state arbitration statutes for guidance.
2. The Commission shall maintain an updated list of qualified arbitrators to
submit with the right-to-arbitrate notice pursuant to section 5 of the Arbitration
Amendment. To generate the listing, the Commission shall consult with state
and local 706 agencies, private arbitration organizations, and civil rights
organizations for defining standards of approval, acquiring resources, and
compiling information.
3. To guide employers in drafting enforceable agreements to arbitrate
statutory discrimination claims, the Commission shall develop a model
Arbitration Agreement which satisfies the statutory conditions set forth under
section 3 of the Arbitration Amendment to Title VIL The Commission shall
consult with state and local 706 agencies, private arbitration organizations, and
civil rights organizations for assistance in developing the model arbitration
agreement.
174. 29 CF.R. §§ 1601.01-.80.
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